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Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently
introduced in [5, 6]. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems:
can a given coalition of agents force that a negotiation terminates (resp. block the negotiation so
that it goes on forever)?; can the coalition force a given outcome of the negotiation? We show that
for arbitrary negotiations the problems are EXPTIME-complete. Then we show that for sound and
deterministic or even weakly deterministic negotiations the problems can be solved in PTIME. Notice
that the input of the problems is a negotiation, which can be exponentially more compact than its state
space.
1 Introduction
In [5, 6], the first author and Jo¨rg Desel have introduced a model of concurrency with multi party nego-
tiation as primitive. The model allows one to describe distributed negotiations obtained by combining
“atomic” multi party negotiations, or atoms. Each atom has a number of parties (the subset of agents
involved), and a set of possible outcomes. The parties agree on an outcome, which determines for each
party the subset of atoms it is ready to engage in next.
Ill-designed negotiations may deadlock, or may contains useless atoms, i.e., atoms that can never
be executed. The problem whether a negotiation is well designed or sound was studied in [5, 6]. The
main result was the identification of two classes, called deterministic and acyclic weakly deterministic
negotiations, for which the soundness problem is tractable: while the problem is PSPACE-complete for
arbitrary negotiations, it becomes polynomial for these two classes.
In this paper we start the study of games on negotiations. As for games played on pushdown automata
[12], vector addition systems with states (VASS) [3], counter machines [9], or asynchronous automata
[10], games on negotiations can be translated into games played on the (reachable part of the) state space.
However, the number of states of a negotiation may grow exponentially in the number of agents, and so
the state space can be exponentially larger than the negotiation. We explore the complexity of solving
games in the size of the negotiation, not on the size of the state space. In particular, we are interested
in finding negotiation classes for which the winner can be decided in polynomial time, thus solving the
state space explosion problem.
We study games formalizing the two most interesting questions related to a negotiation. First, can a
given coalition (i.e., a given subset of agents) force termination of the negotiation? (Negotiations may
contain cycles.) Second, can the coalition force a given final outcome?
Our first results show that these two problems are EXPTIME-complete in the size of the negotiation.
This is the case even if the negotiation is deterministic, and so it seems as if the tractability results of
[5, 6] cannot be extended to games. But then, we are able to show that, very surprisingly, the problems
are polynomial for deterministic (or even weakly deterministic) negotiations that are sound. This is very
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satisfactory: since unsound negotiations are ill-designed, we are not interested in them anyway. And,
very unexpectedly, the restriction to sound negotiations has as collateral effect a dramatic improvement in
the complexity of the problem. Moreover, the restriction comes “at no cost”, because deciding soundness
of deterministic negotiations is also decidable in polynomial time.
The full version of this paper including the appendix is available on arXiv.org.
Related work. Our games can be seen as special cases of concurrent games [2, 1] in which the arena
is succinctly represented as a negotiation. Explicit construction of the arena and application of the
algorithms of [2, 1] yields an exponential algorithm, while we provide a polynomial one.
Negotiations have the same expressive power as 1-safe Petri nets or 1-safe VASS, although they can
be exponentially more compact (see [5, 6]). Games for unrestricted VASS have been studied in [3].
However, in [3] the emphasis is on VASS with an infinite state space, while we concentrate on the 1-safe
case.
The papers closer to ours are those studying games on asynchronous automata (see e.g. [10, 7, 8]).
Like negotiations, asynchronous automata are a model of distributed computation with a finite state
space. These papers study algorithms for deciding the existence of distributed strategies for a game, i.e.,
local strategies for each agent based only on the information the agent has on the global system. Our
results identify a special case with much lower complexity than the general one, in which local strategies
are even memoryless.
Finally, economists have studied mathematical models of negotiation games, but with different goals
and techniques (see e.g. [11]). In our terminology, they typically consider negotiations in which all
agents participate in all atomic negotiations. We focus on distributed negotiations, where in particular
atomic negotiations involving disjoint sets of agents may occur concurrently.
2 Negotiations: Syntax and Semantics
Negotiations are introduced in [5]. We recall the main definitions. We fix a finite set A of agents repre-
senting potential parties of negotiations. In [5, 6] each agent has an associated set of internal states. For
the purpose of this paper the internal states are irrelevant, and so we omit them.
Atoms. A negotiation atom, or just an atom, is a pair n = (Pn,Rn), where Pn ⊆ A is a nonempty set of
parties, and Rn is a finite, nonempty set of outcomes.
(Distributed) Negotiations. A distributed negotiation is a set of atoms together with a transition function
X that assigns to every triple (n,a,r) consisting of an atom n, a party a of n, and an outcome r of n a set
X (n,a,r) of atoms. Intuitively, this is the set of atomic negotiations agent a is ready to engage in after
the atom n, if the outcome of n is r.
Formally, given a finite set of atoms N, let T (N) denote the set of triples (n,a,r) such that n ∈ N,
a∈ Pn, and r ∈ Rn. A negotiation is a tuple N = (N,n0,n f ,X ), where n0,n f ∈ N are the initial and final
atoms, and X : T (N)→ 2N is the transition function. Further, N satisfies the following properties: (1)
every agent of A participates in both n0 and n f ; (2) for every (n,a,r) ∈ T (N): X (n,a,r) = /0 iff n = n f .
Graphical representation. Negotiations are graphically represented as shown in Figure 1. For each
atom n ∈ N we draw a black bar; for each party a of Pn we draw a white circle on the bar, called a port.
For each (n,a,r) ∈ T (N), we draw a hyper-arc leading from the port of a in n to all the ports of a in the
atoms of X (n,a,r), and label it by r. Figure 1 shows two Father-Daughter-Mother negotiations. On the
left, Daughter and Father negotiate with possible outcomes yes (y), no (n), and ask mother (am). If the
outcome is the latter, then Daughter and Mother negotiate with outcomes yes, no. In the negotiation on
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Figure 1: An acyclic and a cyclic negotiation.
the right, Father, Daughter and Mother negotiate with outcomes yes and no. If the outcome is yes, then
Father and Daughter negotiate a return time (atom n1) and propose it to Mother (atom n2). If Mother
approves (outcome yes), then the negotiation terminates, otherwise (outcome r) Daughter and Father
renegotiate the return time.
Semantics. A marking of a negotiation N = (N,n0,n f ,X ) is a mapping x : A → 2N . Intuitively,
x(a) is the set of atoms that agent a is currently ready to engage in next. The initial and final markings,
denoted by x0 and x f respectively, are given by x0(a) = {n0} and x f (a) = /0 for every a ∈ A.
A marking x enables an atom n if n ∈ x(a) for every a ∈ Pn, i.e., if every party of n is currently ready
to engage in it. If x enables n, then n can take place and its parties agree on an outcome r; we say that
(n,r) occurs. Abusing language, we will call this pair also an outcome. The occurrence of (n,r) produces
a next marking x′ given by x′(a) =X (n,a,r) for every a ∈ Pn, and x′(a) = x(a) for every a ∈ A\Pn. We
write x (n,r)−−→ x′ to denote this.
By this definition, x(a) is always either {n0} or equals X (n,a,r) for some atom n and outcome r.
The marking x f can only be reached by the occurrence of (n f ,r) (r being a possible outcome of n f ), and
it does not enable any atom. Any other marking that does not enable any atom is a deadlock.
Reachable markings are graphically represented by placing tokens (black dots) on the forking points
of the hyper-arcs (or in the middle of an arc). Figure 1 shows on the right a marking in which F and D
are ready to engaging n1 and M is ready to engage in n2.
We write x1
σ
−→ to denote that there is a sequence
x1
(n1,r1)
−−−→ x2
(n2,r2)
−−−→ ·· ·
(nk−1,rk−1)
−−−−−−→ xk
(nk,rk)
−−−→ xk+1 · · ·
such that σ = (n1,r1) . . . (nk,rk) . . .. If x1
σ
−→, then σ is an occurrence sequence from the marking x1, and
x1 enables σ . If σ is finite, then we write x1
σ
−→ xk+1 and say that xk+1 is reachable from x1.
Soundness. A negotiation is sound if (a) every atom is enabled at some reachable marking, and (b) every
occurrence sequence from the initial marking either leads to the final marking x f , or can be extended to
an occurrence sequence that leads to x f .
The negotiations of Figure 1 are sound. However, if we set in the left negotiation X (n0,M,st)= {n2}
instead of X (n0,M,st) = {n2,n f }, then the occurrence sequence (n0,st)(n1,yes) leads to a deadlock.
Determinism and weak determinism. An agent a ∈ A is deterministic if for every (n,a,r) ∈ T (N)
such that n 6= n f there exists an atom n′ such that X (n,a,r) = {n′}.
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The negotiation N is weakly deterministic if for every (n,a,r) ∈ T (N) there is a deterministic agent
b that is a party of every atom in X (n,a,r), i.e., b ∈ Pn′ for every n′ ∈ X (n,a,r). In particular, every
reachable atom has a deterministic party. It is deterministic if all its agents are deterministic.
Graphically, an agent a is deterministic if no proper hyper-arc leaves any port of a, and a negotiation is
deterministic if there are no proper hyper-arcs. The negotiation on the left of Figure 1 is not deterministic
(it contains a proper hyper-arc for Mother), while the one on the right is deterministic.
3 Games on Negotiations
We study a setting that includes, as a special case, the questions about coalitions mentioned in the intro-
duction: Can a given coalition (subset of agents) force termination of the negotiation? Can the coalition
force a given concluding outcome?
In many negotiations, there are reachable markings that enable more than one atom. If two of those
atoms share an agent, the occurrence of one might disable the other and they are not truly concurrent.
For a game where we want to allow concurrent moves, we formalize this concept with the notion of an
independent set of atoms.
Definition 3.1. A set of atoms S is independent if no two distinct atoms of S share an agent, i.e., Pn∩Pn′ =
/0 for every n,n′ ∈ S, n 6= n′.
It follows immediately from the semantics that if a marking x enables all atoms of S and we fix
an outcome ri for each ni ∈ S, then there is a unique marking x′ such that x
σ
−→ x′ for every sequence
σ = (n1,r1) . . . (nk,rk) such that each atom of S appears exactly once in σ . In other words, x′ depends
only on the outcomes of the atoms, and not on the order in which they occur.
A negotiation arena is a negotiation whose set N of atoms is partitioned into two sets N1 and N2. We
consider concurrent games [2, 1] with three players called Player 1, Player 2, and Scheduler. At each
step, Scheduler chooses a nonempty set of independent atoms among the atoms enabled at the current
marking of the negotiation arena. Then, Player 1 and Player 2, independently of each other, select an
outcome for each atom in S∩N1 and S∩N2, respectively. Finally, these outcomes occur in any order, and
the game moves to the unique marking x′ mentioned above. The game terminates if it reaches a marking
enabling no atoms, otherwise it continues forever.
Formally, a partial play is a sequence of tuples (Si,Fi,1,Fi,2) where each Si ⊆ N is a set of inde-
pendent atoms and Fi, j assigns to every n ∈ Si ∩N j an outcome r ∈ Rn. Furthermore it must hold that
every atom n ∈ Si is enabled after all atoms in S0, ...,Si−1 have occurred with the outcomes specified by
F0,1,F0,2, ...,Fi−1,1,Fi−1,2. A play is a partial play that is either infinite or reaches a marking enabling no
atoms. For a play pi we denote by pii the partial play consisting of the first i tuples of pi .
We consider two different winning conditions. In the termination game, Player 1 wins a play if the
play ends with n f occurring, otherwise Player 2 wins. In the concluding-outcome game, we select for
each agent a a set of outcomes Ga such that n f ∈X (n,a,r) for r ∈Ga (that is, after any outcome r ∈Ga,
agent a is ready to terminate). Player 1 wins if the the play ends with n f occurring, and for each agent a
the last outcome (n,r) of the play such that a is a party of n belongs to Ga.
A strategy σ for Player j, j∈{1,2} is a partial function that, given a partial play pi =(S0,F0,1,F0,2), ..,
(Si,Fi,1,Fi,2) and a set of atoms Si+1 returns a function Fi+1, j according to the constraints above. A play
pi is said to be played according to a strategy σ of Player j if for all i, σ(pii,Si+1) = Fi+1, j. A strategy
σ is a winning strategy for Player j if he wins every play that is played according to σ . Player j is said
to win the game if he has a winning strategy. Notice that if Player 1 has a winning strategy then he wins
every play against any pair of strategies for Player 2 and Scheduler.
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Definition 3.2. Let N be a negotiation arena. The termination (resp. concluding-outcome) problem for
N consists of deciding whether Player 1 has a winning strategy for the termination game (concluding-
outcome game).
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Figure 2: Atom control and determinism
Assume we want to model the following situation: In a family with Father (F), Mother (M) and two
Daughters (D1 and D2), Daughter D1 wants to go to a party. She can talk to each parent individually, but
can choose beforehand whether to take her sister D2 with her or not. Figure 2 models this negotiation.
The solid edges for the daughters between n2 and n3 and between n4 and n5 “ask the other parent”
outcomes, while the dashed edges represent the “yes” and “no” outcomes. Assume the daughters work
together to reach termination. Then in N1 = {n1,n2,n3} the daughters have a majority which we will
interpret as “they can choose which outcome is taken”. Can the daughters force termination?
At atom n1 the daughters decide whether D2 should participate in the conversation with the parents
(outcome t) or not (outcome s). If the daughters choose outcome s, then Father and Mother can force
an infinite loop between n4 and n5. On the contrary, if the daughters choose to stay together, then, since
they control atom n2, they can force a “yes” or “no” outcome, and therefore termination.
The questions whether a coalition C of agents can force termination or a certain outcome are special
instances of the termination and concluding-outcome problems. In these instances, an atom n belongs to
N1—the set of atoms controlled by Player 1— iff a strict majority of the agents of n are members of C .
3.1 Coalitions
Before we turn to the termination and concluding-outcome problems, we briefly study coalitions. Intu-
itively, a coalition controls all the atoms where it has strict majority. We show that while the definition
of the partition of the atoms N according to the participating agents may seem restricting, this is not
the case: In all cases but the deterministic sound case, any partition can be reached, possibly by adding
agents.
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We define the partition of N via a partition of the agents: Let the agents A be partitioned into two sets
A1 and A2. Define N1 = {n ∈ N : |Pn∩A1|> |Pn∩A2|}, N2 = N\N1. Note that ties are controlled by A2.
We first show that in the nondeterministic and weakly deterministic case, this definition is equivalent
to one where we decide control for each atom and not for each agent.
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a a
a a
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Figure 3: Atom control via additional agents
Consider the example given in Figure 3. On the left a deterministic negotiation with two agents is
given. Assume the coalitions are A1 = {A} and A2 = {B}. By the definition above, N2 = N, thus coalition
A2 controls every atom. We want to change control of n1 so that A1 controls n1, changing the negotiation
to a weakly deterministic one on the way. We add an additional agent a that participates in n0,n1,n f as
shown in Figure 3 in the middle and set A1 = {A,a}. Now A1 controls n1 but also n0 and n f . We therefore
add another agent b that participates in n0,n f as shown in Figure 3 on the right. Now the partition of
atoms is exactly N1 = {n1} and N2 = {n0,n2,n f }, as desired. In general, by adding nondeterministic
agents to the negotiation, we can change the control for each atom individually. For each atom n whose
control we wish to change, we add a number of agents to that atom, the initial atom n0 and final atom
n f . We add nondeterministic edges for these agent from n0 to {n,n f } for each outcome of n0 and from n
to {n,n f } for each outcome of n. It may be necessary to add more agents to n0 that move to n f in order
to preserve the control of n0 or n f . This procedure changes the control of n while preserving soundness
and weak determinism.
We proceed by showing that in the deterministic case, we cannot generate any atom control by adding
more agents.
Lemma 3.3. We cannot add deterministic agents to the negotiation on the loft of Figure 3 in a manner,
such that soundness is preserved and Player 1 controls n1, Player 2 controls n2.
Proof. Consider again the deterministic negotiation game on the left of Figure 3. Assume we have added
deterministic agents such that Player 1 controls n1. After the occurring sequence x0
(n0,a)
−−−→ x1
(n1,a)
−−−→ x2,
those additional agents have moved deterministically, either to n1 or n f . 1
If any agent remains in n1, choosing outcome b in n2 leads to a deadlock, otherwise, choosing a leads
to a deadlock. Thus the negotiation is no longer sound.
1Moving to n2 would change the control there, thus additional agents have to be added to n2, we then can use a similar
argument as follows by exchanging the roles of n1 and n2.
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4 The Termination Problem
We turn to the general complexity of the problem. It is easy to see that the termination problem can be
solved in exponential time.
Theorem 4.1. The termination problem is in EXPTIME.
Proof. Sketch. (See the appendix for details.) We construct a concurrent reachability game on a graph
such that Player 1 wins the negotiation game iff she wins this new game. The game has single exponential
size in the size of the negotiation arena.
The nodes of the graph are either markings x of the negotiation, or pairs (x,Nx), where x is a marking
and Nx is an independent set of atoms enabled at x. Nodes x belong to Scheduler, who chooses a set Nx,
after which the play moves to (x,Nx). At nodes (x,Nx) Players 1 and 2 concurrently select outcomes for
their atoms in Nx, and depending on their choice the play moves to a new marking. Player 1 wins if the
play reaches the final marking x f . Since the winner of a concurrent game with reachability objectives
played on a graph can be determined in polynomial time (see e.g. [2]), the result follows.
Unfortunately, there is a matching lower bound.
Theorem 4.2. The termination problem is EXPTIME-hard even for negotiations in which every reach-
able marking enables at most one atom.
Proof. Sketch. (See the appendix for details.) The proof is by reduction from the acceptance problem
for alternating, linearly-bounded Turing machines (TM)[4]. Let M be such a TM with transition relation
δ , and let x be an input of length n.
We define a negotiation with an agent I modeling the internal state of M, an agent P modeling the
position of the head, and one agent Ci for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n modeling the i-th cell of the tape. The set of
atoms contains one atom nq,α ,k for each triple (q,α ,k), where q is a state of M, k is the current position
of the head, and α is the current symbol in the k-th tape cell.
The parties of the atom nq,α ,k are I, P and Ck, in particular, I and P are agents of all atoms. The atom
nq,α ,k has one outcome rτ for each element τ ∈ δ (q,α), where τ is a triple consisting of a new state,
a new tape symbol, and a direction for the head. We informally define the function X (nq,α ,k,Ck,rτ)
by means of an example. Assume that, for instance, τ = (q′,β ,R), i.e., at control state q and with the
head reading α , the machine can go to control state q′, write β , and move the head to the right. Then
we have: (i) X (nq,α ,k, I,rτ) contains all atoms of the form nq′, , (where stands for a wildcard); (ii)
X (nq,α ,k,P,r) contains the atoms n , ,k+1; and (iii) X (nq,α ,k,Ck,rτ) contains all atoms n ,β , . If atom
nq,α ,k is the only one enabled and the outcome rτ occurs, then clearly in the new marking the only atom
enabled is nq′,β ,k+1. So every reachable marking enables at most one atom.
Finally, the negotiation also has an initial atom that, loosely speaking, takes care of modeling the
initial configuration.
The partition of the atoms is: an atom nq,α ,k belongs to N1 if q is an existential state of M, and to N2
if it is universal. It is easy to see that M accepts x iff Player 1 has a winning strategy.
Notice that if no reachable marking enables two or more atoms, Scheduler never has any choice.
Therefore, the termination problem is EXPTIME-hard even if the strategy for Scheduler is fixed.
A look at points (i)-(iii) in the proof sketch of this theorem shows that the negotiations obtained
by the reduction are highly nondeterministic. In principle we could expect a lower complexity in the
deterministic case. However, this is not the case.
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Theorem 4.3. The termination problem is EXPTIME-hard even for deterministic negotiations in which
every reachable marking enables at most one atom.
Proof. Sketch. (See the appendix for details.) We modify the construction of Theorem 4.2 so that it
yields a deterministic negotiation. The old construction has an atom nq,α ,k for each state q, tape symbol
α , and cell index k, with I, P, and Ck as parties.
The new construction adds atoms nq,k, with I and P as parties, and nα ,k, with P and Ck as parties.
Atoms nq,k have an outcome for each tape symbol α , and atoms nα ,k have an outcome for each state q.
New atoms are controlled by Player 1.
In the new construction, after the outcome of nq,α ,k for transition (q′,β ,R)∈ δ (q,α), agent Ck moves
to nβ ,k, and agents I and P move to nq′,k+1. Intuitively, Ck waits for the head to return to cell k, while
agents I and P proceed. Atom nq′,k+1 has an outcome for every tape symbol γ . Intuitively, at this atom
Player 1 guesses the current tape symbol in cell k+1; the winning strategy corresponds to guessing right.
After guessing, say, symbol γ , agent I moves directly to nq′,γ ,k+1, while P moves to nγ ,k+1. Atom nγ ,k+1
has one outcome for every state of M. Intuitively, Player 1 now guesses the current control state q′, after
which both P and Ck+1 move to nq′,γ ,k+1. Notice that all moves are now deterministic.
If Player 1 follows the winning strategy, then the plays mimic those of the old construction: a step like
(nq,α ,k,(q′,β ,R)) in the old construction, played when the current symbol in cell k+1 is γ , is mimicked
by a sequence (nq,α ,k,(q′,β ,R)) (nq′,k+1,γ) (nγ ,k+1,q′) of moves in the new construction.
5 Termination in Sound Deterministic Negotiations
In [5, 6] it was shown that the soundness problem (deciding whether a negotiation is sound) can be
solved in polynomial time for deterministic negotiations and acyclic, weakly deterministic negotiations
(the case of cyclic weakly deterministic negotiations is open), while the problem is PSPACE-complete for
arbitrary negotiations. Apparently, Theorem 4.3 proves that the tractability of deterministic negotiations
stops at game problems. We show that this is not the case. Well-designed negotiations are sound, since
otherwise they contain atoms that can never occur (and can therefore be removed), or a deadlock is
reachable. Therefore, we are only interested in the termination problem for sound negotiations. We
prove that for sound deterministic negotiations (in fact, even for the larger class of weakly deterministic
type 2 negotiations) the termination and concluding-outcome problems are solvable in polynomial time.
For this, we show that the well-known attractor construction for reachability games played on graphs as
arenas can be “lifted” to sound and weakly deterministic type 2 negotiation arenas.
Definition 5.1. Let N be a negotiation arena with a set of atoms N = N1∪N2. Given n ∈ N, let Pn,det
be the set of deterministic agents participating in n.
The attractor of the final atom n f is A =
∞⋃
k=0
Ak, where A0 = {n f } and
Ak+1 = Ak ∪ {n ∈ N1 : ∃r ∈ Rn∀a ∈ Pn,det : X (n,a,r) ∈Ak}
∪ {n ∈ N2 : ∀r ∈ Rn∀a ∈ Pn,det : X (n,a,r) ∈Ak}
Given a marking x 6= x f of N and a deterministic agent a, the attractor position of a at x is the
smallest k such that x(a) ∈ Ak, or ∞ if x(a) /∈A . Let a1, . . . ,ak be the deterministic agents of N . The
(attractor) position vector of x is the tuple (p1, ..., pk) where pi is the attractor position of ai.
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Theorem 5.2. Let N be a sound, weakly deterministic type 2 negotiation arena. Player 1 has a winning
strategy in the termination game iff n0 ∈A .
Proof. We start with an observation: If all deterministic agents are ready to take part in n f , then n f and
only n f is enabled. Indeed, since deterministic agents are only ready to engage in at most one atom, the
only atom with a deterministic party that can be enabled is n f . Moreover, by weak determinism type 2
every atom has a deterministic party, and so no atom other than n f can be enabled. Finally, by soundness
at least one atom is enabled, and so n f is the only enabled atom.
(⇐): Assume that n0 ∈ A . We fix the attractor strategy for Player 1. We define the attractor index of
an atom n ∈ A as the smallest k such that n ∈ Ak. The strategy for an atom n ∈ N1 ∩A is to choose
any outcome such that all deterministic parties of n move to an atom of smaller attractor index; formally,
we choose any outcome r such that for every deterministic party a the singular atom in X (n,a,r) has
smaller attractor index than n. Such an outcome exists by construction of A . For atoms n ∈ N1 \A we
choose an arbitrary atom. Notice that this strategy is not only memoryless, but also independent of the
current marking.
We show that the attractor strategy is winning. By the definition of the game, we have to prove that
every play following the strategy ends with n f occurring. By the observation above, it suffices to prove
that the play reaches a marking at which every deterministic agent is ready to engage in n f .
Assume there is a play pi where Player 1 plays according to the attractor strategy, which never reaches
such a marking. Then the play never reaches the final marking x f either. We claim that at all markings
reached along pi , the deterministic agents are only ready to engage in atoms of A . We first observe
that, initially, all deterministic agents are ready to engage in n0, and n0 ∈A . Now, assume that in some
marking reached along pi the deterministic agents are only ready to engage in atoms of A . Then, by weak
determinism type 2, all enabled atoms belong to A , and therefore also the atoms chosen by Scheduler.
By the definition of A , after an atom of N2∩A occurs, the deterministic agents are ready to engage in
atoms of A only; by the definition of the attractor strategy, the same holds for atoms of N1∩A . This
concludes the proof of the claim.
Since all markings x reached along pi satisfy x 6= x f and x(a) ∈ A for every deterministic agent
a, they all have an associated attractor position vector whose components are natural numbers. Let Pk
denote the position vector of the marking reached after k≥ 0 steps in pi . Initially only the initial atom n0 is
enabled, and so P0 = (k0,k0, . . . ,k0), where k0 is the attractor position of n0. We have k0 < |N|, the number
of atoms of the negotiation arena N . Given two position vectors P = (p1, ..., pk) and P′ = (p′1, ..., p′k),
we say P ≺ P′ if pi ≤ p′i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and pi < p′i for at least one 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By the definition of
the attractor strategy, the sequence P0,P1, ... of attractor positions satisfies Pi+1 ≺ Pi for every i. Since ≺
is a well-founded order, the sequence is finite, i.e., the game terminates. By the definition of the game, it
terminates at a marking that does not enable any atom. Since, by assumption, the play never reaches the
final marking x f , this marking is a deadlock, which contradicts the soundness of N .
(⇒): As this part is dual to part ⇐, we only sketch the idea. The complete proof can be found in the
appendix.
Let B = N \A , and assume n0 ∈ B. A winning strategy for Player 2 is to choose for an atom
n ∈ N2∩B any outcome r such that at least one deterministic agent moves to an atom not in A . Such
an outcome exists by construction of A . For atoms in N2 \B we chose an arbitrary outcome.
This strategy achieves the following invariant: If at some marking x reached along a play according
to this strategy, there is a deterministic agent a that satisfies x(a) = n and n ∈ B, then the same holds
after one more step of the play. We then conclude that since n0 ∈B this invariant holds in every step of
the play. Therefore n f , in which all deterministic agents participate and which is not in B, can never be
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enabled. Finally, because of soundness a play cannot end in a deadlock and thus every play will be of
infinite length.
Corollary 5.3. For the termination game over sound and weakly deterministic type 2 negotiations, the
following holds:
(a) The game collapses to a two-player game.
(b) Memoryless strategies suffice for both players.
(c) The winner and the winning strategy can be computed in O(|R| ∗ |A|) time, where A is the set of
agents and |R| the total number of outcomes of the negotiation.
Proof. (a) and (b): The attractor computation and the strategies used in the proof of Theorem 5.2 are
independent of the choices of Scheduler; the strategies are memoryless.
(c) An algorithm achieving this complexity can be found in the appendix.
We still have to consider the possibility that requiring soundness alone, without the addition of weak
determinism type 2, already reduces the complexity of the termination problem. The following theorem
shows that this is not the case, and concludes our study. The proof is again an adaption of the reduction
from turing machines and can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 5.4. The termination problem is EXPTIME-hard for sound negotiation arenas.
6 The Concluding-Outcome Problem
We demonstrate that the algorithm can also be used to solve the concluding-outcome problem. Remem-
ber that for each agent a we have selected a set Ga of outcomes that lead to the final atom and that we
want occur. The key idea is to modify the negotiation in the following way: We add two atoms per agent,
say gooda and bada, and redirect the outcomes of that agent that lead to the final atom to gooda if they
are in Ga and to bada otherwise. We illustrate this approach by example.
We slightly change the setting of Father, Mother and two Daughters such that both daughters want
to go to the party. In the negotiation, that results in two additional atoms where D2 talks alone with
each parent. Figure 4 shows the new negotiation omitting all edges of father and mother to simplify the
representation. They both have a nondeterministic edge from each of their ports leading to all of their
respective ports.
Imagine the goal of Daughter D1 is to get a “yes” answer for herself, but a ‘no” answer for D2,
who always spoils the fun. Will a coalition with one parent suffice to achieve the goal? To answer
this question, we modify the negotiation before applying the construction as shown in Figure 4. We
introduce dummy atoms goodi and badi for each Daughter i, and we redirect “yes” transitions leading to
n f to good1 and bad2 (these transitions are represented as dashed lines), analogously we redirect “no”
transitions to bad1 and good2 (represented as dotted lines).
We apply the algorithm with a slight alteration: Instead of starting from n f , we initially add all
newly introduced good atoms to the attractor. Applying the algorithm for the coalition Father-D1 yields
{good1,bad2,n4} as attractor; for Mother-D1 we get {good1,bad2,n5}. So neither parent has enough
influence to achieve the desired outcome.
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Figure 4: Applying the algorithm to the final-outcome problem. Father and mother edges omitted.
7 Conclusions and Related Work
We have started the study of games in the negotiation model introduced in [5, 6]. Our results confirm the
low computational complexity of deterministic negotiations, however with an important twist: while even
the simplest games are EXPTIME-hard for arbitrary deterministic negotiations, they become polynomial
in the sound case. So soundness, a necessary feature of a well designed negotiation, also turns out to
have a drastic beneficial effect on the complexity of the games.
We have shown that our games are also polynomial for sound and weakly deterministic negotiations.
However, the complexity of deciding soundness for this case is unknown. We conjecture that it is also
polynomial, as for the deterministic case.
The objectives we have considered so far are qualitative: Either a coalition can reach termination or
not, either it can enforce a concluding outcome or not. A possibility for future studies would be to look
at quantitative objectives.
We have only considered 2-player games, since in our settings the behavior of the third player (the
Scheduler) is either irrelevant, or is controlled by one of the other two players. We intend to study the
extension to a proper 3-player game, or to a multi player game. Combined with qualitative objectives,
this allows for multiple interesting questions: Which coalition of three agents can reach the best payoff?
Which two agents should a given agent side with to maximize his payoff? Are there “stable” coalitions,
that means, no agents can change to the opposing coalition and improve his payoff?
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